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ABSTRACT       Budgetary control is a major aspect of management control and one that has 
undergone major shifts of emphasis in both the literature and practice in much of the later part 
of the 20th century. At the same time the movement from a manufacturing to a knowledge or 
service type environment has also been accompanied by an increasing acknowledgement of 
individual contribution to organisation performance. This has happened in a business context 
where the influence of the capital markets has impacted on the budget and other control 
practices of organisations. This paper draws on a detailed field study focusing on the individual 
and the problematic nature of budgetary control in a changing operational environment that 
acknowledges both the importance, internally, of the organisation members and externally, the 
growing influence of shareholders on business operations. 
 
From an operations viewpoint, control and accountability for results continues to move down 
the organisation to the level of the individual in a manner that could be said to lead to a 
“performative contradiction” running counter to the ideal of a individual participatory 
budgeting style.  
 
KEYWORDS: Budget, Management control, Performance, Individual 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper draws upon much of the previous work on budgetary control particularly in 
the areas of participation, slack, performance measurement, time frames and bias, all of which 
are issues for many organisations including the case organisation and the individuals therein 
(Argyris, 1952; Likert, 1961; Hofstede, 1968; Lowe and Shaw, 1968; Schiff and Lewin, 1970; 
Hopwood, 1972; Otley, 1978,2001; Merchant, 1985; Llewellyn, 1998; Van der Stede, 2000). 
While the concept of budgetary control appears well understood, its implementation can be 
problematic for many organisations and this will be illustrated in the case study context of a 
particular organisation, referred to as Eurel. The focus of the analysis will be the individual 
organisation member who is seen as an increasingly important resource contributing to 
organisation performance. 
 
If we acknowledge the growing influence of the individual organisation member Simons (1995) 
and Guthrie (2000), the issue is how the changing budgetary control and performance milieu 
affects that same individual. This changing environment has led to an interest in the implications 
for the individual in organisations. Scientific management described how the focus on the use of 
knowledge was in the extensive use of knowledge in the dissemination of tasks in order to 
control output, an output that was generally tangible by nature. The issue today is that knowledge 
itself can be that output (Simons, 1995; Guthrie, 2000). While this output still needs control, the 
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control mechanisms including budgetary control, should recognise the increased emphasis on the 
individual contribution to that output. As Hopwood (1974) argues “Ultimately all forms of 
control must be expressed through the actions of individuals”. This is all the more important as 
the owner of that knowledge is also the individual, as Drucker (1999) argues “ we know that the 
source of wealth is something specifically human: knowledge”. The early work of Lowe and 
Shaw (1968) see budgetary control as part of behavioural theory where budgets act as an enabler 
allowing the resolution of managerial coalitions and conflicts. This behavioural theme is also an 
essential element of the research by Hopwood (1972) and Otley (1978, 2001). For example, 
Otley (2001), in discussing budgetary control takes as a starting point Argyris’s 1952 paper 
entitled The impact of budgets on people as exemplifying the essentially behavioural work done 
relative to control during that period which also included Schiff and Lewin (1970) and Hofstede 
(1968).  
 
The paper starts with a review of the essence of budgetary control with a focus on the issues of 
participation, slack, measurement, time frames and bias. This section also signals and integrates 
aspects of a changing business environment and the connection to individuals in organisations. 
This is followed by a review of budgetary control aspects of the management control literature. 
There is also a brief description of the case organisation and in particular the two business units 
that form and provide the case detail. This is followed in the third section by brief description of 
the research methodology. The fourth section includes the empirical discussion of the case study 
data. The paper concludes with a final summary that synthesises the results and allows a 
discussion on the extension of existing theory.  
 
 
The Essence Of Budgetary Control  
 
Buckley and McKenna (1972) describe budgetary control as consisting of planning, 
controlling, co-ordinating and motivation through money values and departments within an 
organisation. It is a plan, in quantitative terms, usually for one year. Hofstede (1968, p15) 
describes budgetary control as planning translated into monetary terms. The essence of the 
process is the influencing of management behaviour by setting agreed performance standards 
and controlling the attainment of those standards. For Hofstede (1968), the planning or budget 
function appears steeped in a stable environment.  Perhaps this is typical of the inside out view 
of the organisation’s place in its environment. However, in the current changing business 
context, the budget process is of necessity more connected to the uncertainty of that environment 
which will be argued to be in keeping with a shorter term perspective. 
 
From an overall company control perspective, more recently Otley (2001) notes that the 
assumption of budgetary control is that it is the main integrative control method for most 
business enterprises. The assumption being that an organisation’s business plan can be 
represented financially by the budget and that the budget can be used as a monitoring and 
controlling method for the complex issues of the business plan. This emphasis sees the budget 
lonked to the overall attainment of organisation performance targets. 
 
While there appears to be general agreement on the behavioural, planning and control objectives 
of budgetary control it’s implementation can be problematic (Lowe and Shaw, 1968; Hopwood, 
1972; Llewellyn, 1998). To understand the reasons for this, we need to look not only inside the 
organisation but also at the outside environment and the unpredictability of that context. 
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The Environment Of Change And Influence 
 
Otley (2001) noted that although budgetary control is part of a complex organisation 
reality, it appears to “work reasonably satisfactorily in a relatively stable environment” (p.257). 
It is therefore relevant to question whether the dynamic nature of the current business 
environment also influences the reactions of organisational members to a changing budget 
environment. 
 
Recent years have seen much change in organisational life and the research literature has 
catalogued this (Forrester, 1965; Drucker, 1988, 1999; Handy, 1996; Giddens, 2000). The notion 
of the fixed stable organisation has seemingly, been replaced by one that is ever changing and 
flexible where the individual and his/her contribution ability is increasingly recognised. This 
theme is echoed by Simons (1995) and Guthrie (2000), who recognise the contribution of the 
individual to the continued competitive advantage of the organisation. Simons in his quest for 
appropriate measures for the intangible aspects of risk and uncertainty and Guthrie who argues 
for more meaningful measures for Intellectual Capital that is the product of individual 
contribution. The issue of risk is also taken up by Collier and Berry (2002) who take the notion 
of uncertainty and the outside environment and conceptualise it in terms of risk and attitudes 
towards that risk in budgeting. They argue that much of the previous work on risk in accounting 
was technically related to predictability with the use of decision tools such as probabilities and 
decision trees. Their study examines risk from the point of view of the managers charged with 
incorporating it into the budget process.  
 
Despite the acknowledgement of the growing importance of individual contribution to 
organisations, a numbers of issues arise including a business context that is becoming 
problematic in relation to issues of budget participation as well as the increasing influence on 
organisation control by the outside investment community (Drucker, 1999; Haslam et al, 2000). 
While, this undoubtedly affects the perceived levels of budget responsibility, the process of 
establishing and its subsequent implementation and monitoring cannot be completed without the 
contribution of organisation members. This appears to be especially true in the accountability for 
results. In both the public and private sectors, accountability is being driven down the 
organisation to the level of the individual (Roberts, 1996; Townley, 1995, 1996; Llewellyn, 
1998; Beck, 2000).  
 
The current problem for budgetary control is how to control in an environment where there are 
also changing patterns both inside and outside the organisation. Outside the organisation we need 
a better understanding of the issues of change. What are the drivers of change and how are they 
effecting the organisation and the individuals within? Historically, the focus was internal to the 
organisation. With the 1970’s, came an increased recognition of the importance of the 
environment and organisations recognising their place within that environment (Otley, 1980). 
Contingency theory recognised, not only the contingent variables such as technology, structure 
and size but also the effect of the outside environment and the uncertainty that that brings to it 
(Otley, Broadbent and Berry, 1995; Collier and Berry, 2002). 
 
For the organisation, there is a growing need to interact with not only the product market but also 
increasingly, the capital markets (Haslam et al, 2000). The expectations of shareholders impact 
in a number of ways and one issue to be considered is that of corporate credibility. There is little 
doubt that the business environment has, for some time now, been characterised by levels of 
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extreme competitiveness, where technologies and processes have become transferable and more 
easily copied (Teece, 2000 Ch.1)). This has also led to a situation of diminishing profit margins 
that is also the case for the research company Eurel(see below). The demand for credibility in the 
attainment of budgeted results has been led by the shareholders. They no longer have long-term 
loyalty to those organisations (Rappaport, 1986; Handy, 1995; Drucker, 1999; Haslam et al, 
2000;). This changing pattern of shareholder loyalty along with the intensity of competition and 
lowering profit margins has led to growing pressure on organisations for the achievement of 
planned operating results. This is exemplified by the power of the Wall Street analyst community 
who exercise major influence over corporate strategy by their buy or sell recommendations to 
fund managers. Eurel along with other major corporations give quarterly briefings to the analyst 
community as to their expected results for the upcoming periods. Based on these briefings and 
the subsequent actual results, analysts may change their stock recommendations (Riley, 2000).  
 
This section described aspects of the environment of change in relation to the acknowledgement 
of individual contribution as well as the growth in power of the investment community. These 
are essential ingredients in the growing integrativeness and mutuality of dependence that is the 
budgeting process. I now turn to the process itself and review the literature in that area. 
 
 
Budget Bias 
 
 An early study by Lowe and Shaw (1968) studied budget bias (slack) in an environment 
that appears to have been relatively stable. They found considerable evidence of bias both at an 
organisational and in the reaction of individuals to head office manipulation of their input budget 
data. 
 
 Dunk and Perera (1997) studied the relationship between budget participation and slack (bias). 
They argued that budget slack was the difference between the budget and that, which is 
necessary. It can be defined according to Dunk and Perana as the amount that subordinates 
understate their productive capability when selecting standards against which their performance 
will be evaluated. So, it is reasonable to conclude that budget slack relates to aspects of under 
estimating revenues and /or over estimating costs and by inference can be influenced by either a 
group or an individual.  Van der Stede (2000) also studies recent changes in the budget process 
and focuses on aspects of bias (slack) and short- term orientation. In doing so, he notes that the 
literature has been influenced greatly by the seminal work of Hopwood (1972) in attempting to 
understand the possible effects of differing budget control styles. Van der Stede notes that it is 
generally maintained that there is a relationship between dysfunctional behaviour such as bias 
and the incidence of rigidity of budgetary control.  
 
The notion of slack/bias is an important one for the case company Eurel and its business units as 
they are increasingly dependent on knowledge influenced product output where the maximising 
of individual productive capability is very important in the on-going struggle to meet shareholder 
expectations. This contribution is argued in this research to be very dependent on the 
participation of the organisation members especially in the environment where sales and profit 
growth are becoming more difficult to attain.  
 
Another related issue in this area is participation and its effect on the budgetary process. Dunk 
and Perera (1997) argue that there are generally two opposing concerns in the literature 
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revolving around whether participation either reduces the incidence of slack or adds to the 
opportunities to create it. 
 
These conflicting conclusions suggest that the relationship between slack and participation is not 
a simple one but may be dependent on many issues such as evaluative styles and the extent to 
which information can be manipulated to affect budget setting (e.g. Incentives, budget targets). 
Otley (1978) and more recently Merchant (1985) and Dunk (1993) also found that budget bias 
were low when there was a high emphasis on budgetary control. They argue that, contrary to a 
behavioural sciences expectation, that a rigid budgetary environment was more likely to detect 
and so avoid dysfunctional behaviour such as budget bias. The question is how can the element 
of individual contribution be controlled by a more rigid budget process? It may be a case of 
controlling visible commitment but with an inability with regard to individual potential 
commitment.  
 
 
Budget Performance, Participation, Time Frame And Measurement 
 
The study by Lowe and Shaw (1968) highlighted the issue of participation and 
measurement issues within the budget time frame. They found that there was influence from 
head office to the extent that realistic forecasts were considered to mean realism tempered by 
expediency. This led to unrealistically high forecasts. There was also evidence that forecasts 
were linked to what superiors wished to hear and personal self-interest in terms of remuneration 
and promotional possibilities. Lowe and Shaw conclude that there was evidence of both 
individual and company biasing but that it was difficult to assess the extent due to time lags of 
information between forecasts. 
 
The time frame, whether short or long term, is an issue taken up by other researchers such as 
Merchant (1990) who describes in his study, the side effects of the pressure to meet short term 
results. He found evidence to show that this pressure encouraged a short-term orientation as well 
as an environment of data manipulation. Merchant and Manzoni (1989) also came to a similar 
conclusion. They argued that managers faced the prospect of losing resources, bonuses and 
ultimately, possibly, their jobs if they did not focus on attaining results in the short –term. Allen 
(1998) also describes the rapid changes in the business environment of today and argues that 
these changes make obsolete the rigid approach to budgetary control. It is no longer helpful, in 
his opinion, to compare actual results to that forecasted anything up to 15 months previously. He 
argues that amongst the requirements of a more appropriate system, would be the building in of 
accountability to explain the differences between actual and planned performance. This demands 
a more immediate time frame of information reporting. The short-term time frame can  be related 
to the earlier discussion on the changing demands of the shareholding community that is argued 
to be steering a short-term perspective by the organisation. The issue for the case organisation 
Eurel is that the emphasis on the short term may be self-defeating in that the pressure to meet 
short-term results will divert attention away from an organisation history of a longer-term 
perspective. 
 
Kaplan and Norton (1996, 2000) discuss the Balanced Scorecard approach and in doing so, link 
it to the budget process and the notion of a connection between short- term operational and 
longer- term strategy requirements. They argue that the Balanced Scorecard breaks overall 
company strategy down to operational levels and encourages measurement of operational areas. 
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These measures would include not only financial results but also attempt to make tangible the 
measurement of for example, organisational learning. In making operational, the longer-term 
strategic focus of the organisation, they argue that business units can relate their operational 
drivers of change to longer- term corporate strategy. Kaplan and Norton also argue that 
employee buy-in and acceptance of these measures brings a longer-term focus to this shorter-
term budgetary process.  
 
However, the issue of performance and its measurement can be problematic. The issue is that 
performance can include facets of work that are not easily measured. There are aspects of work 
performance that are not easily categorised and /or measured and the danger is that the emphasis 
on the short term ignores the output possibilities of the futureisation of aspects of present work 
performance. If the emphasis continues to focus on a unidirectional short time frame aspect of 
output measurement this could lead to a situation where future output of time related 
organisational member contributions may become problematic. 
 
This study follows other empirical work, which suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between the process and setting of targets and managers commitment to them (Jermier and 
Barkes, 1979; Rhodes and Steers, 1981;Brownell, 1982). These studies are primarily focused on 
the relationship between participative styles and organisational commitment. Nouri and Parker 
(1998) also take up the theme of participation and commitment. They continue the quest for 
understanding in the relationship between participation and job performance. While a number of 
researchers have proposed that this relationship exists (Argyris, 1952; Becker and Green, 1962, 
from Nouri and Parker, 1998), they also  argue that there are additional variables that need to be 
acknowledged in the relationship such as organisational commitment and the adequacy of budget 
expectations. The issue of adequacy of expectations and commitment is not only related to 
participation but is subject to increasing levels of accountability both on the organisation as well 
as at the level of the individual.  
 
 
Research Approach 
 
The approach for this case study research uses Laughlin’s Middle Range Thinking 
(M.R.T.), (1995, 2001) as the underlying framework. This approach requires attention to theory 
and the empirical world as well as an interaction between them in the development and extension 
of existing theory. The key aspect and advantage of using Laughlin’s approach for research is 
that its framework provides a formality and structure that helps guide the investigation into the 
empirical world. Understanding is gained by a mix of structured and subjective processes where 
the receptiveness to change is based on the power of the argument. Laughlin argues for the 
importance of a situated, face to face approach to research, one that uses interviews, 
documentation etc., a method conducive to that of a case study approach that leads to what 
Laughlin (1995, 2001) describes as “a partial understanding of what constitutes the world”. This 
is a world including accounting and budgetary control systems where “there are “skeletal” rather 
than “full” or “no” theories that can explain accounting in practice or generally any empirical 
phenomena” (Laughlin, 2001, p13.). What this means is that it is possible to say something about 
the empirical world being investigated or the way change is absorbed into its organisational 
setting and in doing so, add to our knowledge of the area. This is particularly relevant to this 
research, as the researched company Eurel has undergone change to its business environments. 
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 Laughlin’s Middle Range Thinking has its roots in critical theory and in particular the work of 
Habermas (1987). Although Habermasian theory is essentially aimed at a macro societal level, it 
has been adapted for specific issue evaluation at both societal and organisational levels. For 
example, Law (Murphy, 1990), Management (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992), Accounting 
(Laughlin, 1987, Broadbent et al, 1991, Power and Laughlin, 1996). This study aims to add to 
that body of work by focusing within the organisation and at the level of the individual. 
 
 
The Case Study 
 
The Eurel Company has worldwide sales of approximately $16 billion and there are 
about 72000 employees in total. The period under study is from 1992 through to 1998. Eurel is a 
global leader in Industrial, Consumer, Office, Health care, Safety and other markets. It draws on 
much strength including a rich pool of technology and innovative products as well as a history of 
emphasising the value, encouragement and contribution of its organisation members.  
 
 
Accountability For Results   
 
The earlier discussion on shareholder loyalty and the demand for results have changed 
the traditional relationship between the organisation and the outside investor community. 
Historically, Eurel were able to control, to a great extent, its relationship with the shareholders. 
For example, they used their dividend policy to ensure that shareholders received increasing 
dividends every year for more than 25 years. However, the issue for companies like Eurel is not 
necessarily dividends, which are arguably simply a cash flow decision but rather the issue is 
credibility of results and future earnings potential. Miller (1982) argues that there is no long- 
term relationship between a firm’s dividend policy and the value of its shares.  The value of its 
shares is ultimately ruled by its earnings ability. The issue for the case company is not 
necessarily its dividend policy, important as that is, but rather how it can continue to encourage 
the spirit of individual innovation and contribution that historically rewarded it with a constant 
flow of new products. This is what the investment community will demand for the future. The 
future aspect of both short and long-term is related to the budget process and the financial 
markets. The company uses its budgetary control system and links it to the quarterly financial 
analyst meetings. At these meetings quarterly expectations are signalled to the financial markets 
analyst community. This has become a standard requirement particularly, of U.S. corporations 
including Eurel who know that the penalty for failure to deliver is a possible downgrade in the 
analysts’ buy/sell recommendations to the shareholding community. This constant pressure on 
the share price has changed the company’s use of the budgetary control system. At a macro 
level, the company is held accountable for delivering quarterly financial results and at a micro 
level; this accountability is being driven down the organisation with a changing emphasis of the 
intensity in use of budgeting as a control mechanism. 
 
Llewellyn (1998) describes this relatively recent phenomenon and in doing so provides some 
useful ground rules on the elements of accountability. Llewellyn argues that the process of 
budgetary control acts as a responsibility allocating agent and in doing so can enable an 
environment of accountability but that accountabilities cannot be invoked unless responsibilities 
have been assigned. Therefore responsibility ascription defines who is accountable. 
Responsibility is an “a priori “ to accountability. Llewellyn goes on to discuss the connection 
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between responsibility and authority. This concept comes from the old idea of “Auctor” or one 
who produces, invents or causes (Benn & Peters, 1959, from Llewellyn, 1998). Llewellyn argues 
that where authority resides in an individual then that person is the originator of action and can 
be held responsible for consequences. In this way he/she can be held to account.  
 
About 50 percent of Eurel sales come from Europe, where, with its disparate countries and 
structure has increasingly been a high overhead cost area compared to its U.S. parent country 
with the advantage of one land mass.  Europe continues to under perform its US counterparts due 
primarily to high structural costs and poor credibility on the attainment of budgeted sales and 
profits growth. 
 
Total company sales have been flat and net income has also been difficult to grow.  Analysts 
and investors have been losing patience with the company as it continues to miss many of its 
projections on earnings as evidenced by the falling/stagnant share price during the research time 
frame. The issue for company in Europe is that, although local currency growth is 
outperforming the economies of Europe (8 % growth for 1998), this has failed to produce the 
levels expected in bottom line profit. This has been more or less flat with little increase since 
1997. This is in spite of much delayering in the European structure over the last 4 years. For 
example, the Electronics European Business division, the situation is even more pronounced. 
Sales have been flat at about 60 million dollars and profit is declining. In this business, the last 4 
years has seen many “right sizing” initiatives without any increase in the profit contribution to 
the corporate division owners of the business.   
 
As the company in the US struggles to re-establish itself in the eyes of the shareholding 
community, there is an increasing impatience with the European operations where significant 
investment and change has not delivered the results predicted through the budgeting process. 
This lack of consistency in projections continues to be a major problem particularly in the 
relationship between the corporation and the shareholding community. 
 
The empirical data is drawn from 2 divisions of the company with contrasting histories and 
current issues. They offer contrasting environments in which to study the effects of changing 
control systems. Contingency theory might suggest that there would be differing results in this 
contrasting context. Both of the groups have undergone major change initiatives such as 
downsizing or have been involved in acquisitions. They operate in different markets. One is a 
star performer for the corporation, operating in the healthcare, personal safety market where 
profits are high and the market relatively stable and where the increasing regulated nature of the 
market has provided the impetus for steady volume and product growth through that regulation. 
 
The other division is in a market where the expectation is for pricing to continuously fall and 
where their product range is becoming increasingly commodified. From a strategic sense, they 
are attempting to move from a reliance on their traditional product range, which is easily copied 
by competitors, to one that is more customer- specific and which is based more on core 
technologies. This is a major change for the group and one that will be based more closely on 
the knowledge ability of the group individual members. In this way, they hope to have a more 
sustainable future product range and increased profitability. Both of the business groups operate 
on a Europe wide basis as European business units. 
The groups offer an opportunity to study the effects of the changing control systems in differing 
operating environments.  
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Control And The Budgeting System 
 
 Historically the company had a budget system that was based on a relatively stable 
environment. The forecasting process spanned a period each year of about 8 months and tended 
to include a significant top down influence. The main difficulty was with it taking so long to 
complete that the information was increasingly out of date by its completion. The demand was 
for a more immediate system, one that was integrated more fully in to the main company 
systems. This led to the introduction of the continuous improvement plan (C.I.P.).  This system 
is more iterative and emphasises the continuous nature of the process. It is, in essence a 
continuous rolling forecast. The system focuses on quarterly estimates that importantly tie in 
with the demands of the investment community for quarterly updates on results and expectations. 
These quarterly updates have become a barometer of share value in the current financialised 
environment. In the search for corporate credibility the C.I.P. has taken a very immediate role as 
a mechanism for change and control. It seeks to be the system that facilitates the return to 
consistency as far as corporate performance and results are concerned. However, the manner in 
which this happens appears to be alienating organisation members. The research data (see below) 
shows that management has become more concerned with the short-term attainment of quarterly 
estimates, than with the longer-term strategic issues of the company. While this may be a 
pragmatic issue for management, there is no doubt that the organisation members are reacting to 
that short- term emphasis. 
 
The budgeting system is also designed to be more flexible, building as it does primarily, from the 
bottom up although this is an area that is increasingly problematic as will become clear in the 
interview data discussion. The other advantage is that it emphasises summary information and is 
meant to avoid the detailed financial soul searching that the previous system spent so much time 
on and consequently can, theoretically, be completed in a matter of weeks rather than months as 
in the old system.  In reality, the aspirations of the C.I.P., as it operationally interacts with the 
organisation members has been strained.  
 
 This is an important aspect and goes to the core of the empirical data from the organisation 
members who feel that the case business units are in danger of losing that future perspective and 
adding to the intensity of the current control environment. However, in the immediacy of the 
current business environment and the quest for credibility in current results, the C.I.P. is the 
budget tool of the moment as far as the company is concerned.  
 
 
The Interview Data 
 
Introduction 
 
The empirical data for this study on budgetary control came from 38 interviews 
conducted over a period of about 6 months. The interviews were semi structured and had as their 
objective issues on the changing management control environment as it impacted on the 
organisation members. Budget and budgetary control was a major issue for the business unit 
members and hence became the motivation for this research. 
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The emphasis on results: Changing influences, outside and inside the organisation  
 
In the search for corporate credibility the C.I.P. has taken an immediate role as a 
mechanism for change that has been increasingly felt throughout the organisation. It is therefore 
a powerful tool of internal control in coping with shorter time frames and a multitude of 
estimates. Company members noted: 
 
“The search for corporate credibility led to many requests for estimates. This ties 
in with the C.I.P. quarterly focus.”(Sales Europe- Electronics EBU) 
 
“At a macro level, the company has objectives to meet for its shareholders. It is 
reasonably fair. The issue is that we have been conditioned to not meeting targets 
and to using the forecast to justify structure” (Sales Domestic OH & E S EBU)  
 
Within the organisation and its business units there appears to be an increased emphasis on the 
financial numbers. This may be related to the immediacy of the environment and the demand for 
an improvement in the credibility of results. This focus on immediacy and financial credibility is 
affecting the organisation members and is a recurring theme throughout the interviews and 
analysis. 
 
“Quarterly targets are important. It all hinges around the share price. We must hit 
our quarterly numbers.” (Finance –O H & E S) 
 
While pragmatically, the corporation needs to stabilise its credibility of results attainment, 
in doing so, there appears to be a change in the organisation environment. Where once it 
was “forgiving” as exemplified, perhaps in the stretching longer term nature of the old 
budget regime, it is now more punitive, immediately critical and according to the business 
unit members, increasingly individualised. This punitive atmosphere could be argued to 
have moved down from the corporate level as a reaction to shareholder pressure and has 
impacted the control systems such as the C.I.P.  
 
“ The new C.E.O. is on record as saying he doesn’t believe that we don’t have any poor 
performers and wants to know what we are doing about it” (Bus. Dev. O H & E S EBU) 
 
The perceptions and visibility of who is in control, is an issue within the business groups. This 
illustrates a different approach to control, as was illustrated in many of the interviews. 
 
“I think that there has been a shift in the emphasis as to who runs the company. We 
had eras of marketing and manufacturing. Now, it seems to me, that we are rapidly 
being run by Accountants and Shareholders” (Marketing- Electronics). 
 
“The Shareholders are more important than the employees” (Logistics OH & E S). 
 
These references to the changing influence of the shareholders signal a change in the 
perceptions of the organisation members, as to who is in control of the company. Historically, as 
briefly noted above, the culture of the company was reflected by the old forecast system that had 
a built in review at corporate level for new ideas, projects or investments and was longer term 
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by nature and was visibly encouraging/ forgiving of individual effort. Employees do not see this 
emphasis of the longer- term environment in the current control environment. 
 
“The new CEO is saying the right things about the future but the future talk is then 
backed up by an emphasis on current profits” (Market dev. OH & E S) 
 
So far, the discussion has noted the influence of the outside environmental influence. Inside the 
organisation, operationally, the system appears well regarded for its technical and enabling 
abilities. It is difficult to argue with its operational method and objectives. Interviewees 
acknowledge its power as an enabler of accountability that seems appropriate to the short term 
and longer- term environment. It is also a mechanism of control integrating all operational 
aspects from communications through manufacturing and sales.Many of the interviewees spoke 
about its positive role in for example communications.   
 
 
“ I see the C.I.P. as providing a relationship between our jobs and the shareholders. 
This is what we plan (C.I.P.) and this is what is then communicated to the 
shareholders as what we plan.”(Bus. Dev. O H & E S) 
 
In this way the C.I.P. is shifting the boundary of accountability from the company through the 
business groups to the individual. The link to the shareholders and the quest for consistent and 
credible results are common objectives that the C.I.P. is attempting to enable. 
 
“When the new CEO came in, he talked down the C.I.P. and asked management to 
reduce their commitment by about 4%. This was unusual for the company and for a 
CEO to do. I guess he was trying to establish credible actual results especially with 
the stock market” (Euro mgmnt. Electronics EBU) 
 
However somewhere between the conception, objectives and implementation of the 
C.I.P, attitudes changed and its negative effects on both individuals and their associated 
business groups appears almost universal. 
 
“ The C.I.P. is a nightmare. It has inherent opposing forces. It wants certainty 
but also shooting for the stars” ( Euro mgmnt. O H & E S EBU) 
 
“I don’t want to add to the already unanimous condemnation of it other than to say it 
was an attempt to acknowledge that the previous system took too long” (Euro mgmnt. 
Electronics EBU) 
 
 The C.I.P. process includes a new personalised vocabulary that includes words such as 
Credibility and Personal Credibility 
 
“The forecasting language included terms such as personal credibility as well as 
group/business credibility” (Euro mgmnt. O H & E S EBU). 
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The focus is on meeting targets for the short- term. The emphasis is on the shareholders and 
their requirements for credible results. This is also tied to the ability of the C.I.P. to estimate 
quarterly results. 
 
“ There is an almost psychotic search for credibility. Unfortunately it leads to 
conservatism in forecasting. There are no best guesses because you will get beaten up if 
you don’t meet it” (Sales Electronics EBU). 
 
 
The notion of credibility is linked to trust and trusting. There seems little doubt that credibility 
and trust is an issue for both corporate and the individual within Eurel. While the C.I.P. is 
primarily concerned with the future, changes in control are also being felt on a day-to-day 
operational basis. This includes the issue of trust between the individual unit members and the 
organisation. 
 
“ The historical culture was that the forecast was built up from the bottom up-
now the emphasis is on credibility, you would think that this was still logical but 
the forecast seems to be changed a lot, sometimes illogically. As far as I’m 
concerned, it’s credibility is zero. It is supposed to be democratic but is not, in 
practice.  (Marketing Electronics EBU) 
 
“ We are just finalising the C.I.P. process at the moment. My forecast was 
accepted more or less in this region but because Europe as a whole needs more 
sales, I’m being asked to add substantially to my forecast for next year”  
(Mgmnt. Electronics Domestic) 
 
Having discussed aspects of individual reaction to the changing budget control emphasis, I now 
turn to the integration of the findings and the theoretical framework.  
 
 
Summary Discussion 
 
The emphasis on the changing culture of control through the budget process appears to 
be linked to the newer harder company attitude towards results and the changing nature and 
influence of the shareholder community.  
 
Conceptually the C.I.P. is a bottom up system that for a specific time frame attempts to connect 
the aspirations of the shareholders, the organisation and its members. In terms of the Broadbent 
et al model it is a steering mechanism (control mechanism) used by the company to guide the 
behaviour of its operating systems such as the business units and its members. As an ideal 
organisation budget control system, the unit members have rationally accepted the C.I.P. as a 
legitimate steering mechanism. It’s purpose, mode and means appear to be in keeping with both 
the expectations of the corporation, the outside societal world of the shareholders and internally, 
the sub systems of the business units. However as seen through the data and the individuals 
members, its implementation is proving to be problematic. 
 
In contrast to the previous less flexible forecast system, the C.I.P. conceptually is viewed as 
much more relevant and acceptable in its aims. The process as previously noted builds from the 
Budgeting, the Individual and the Capital Markets: A Case of Fiscal Stress?  
 
 13
bottom up which can be from the individual level and attempts to shift the boundary of 
accountability from the company down through the organisation through the business groups to 
the individual. However, despite the theoretical acceptance of the aims of the C.I.P., its 
implementation is, seen as inherently flawed.  
 
In the case of the C.I.P., the rationally agreed targets should act as a guide to member’s 
behaviour/action. Organisation members acknowledge the pragmatic need for attainment of 
budget results but have difficulty in accepting accountability for budgets that are manipulated 
and where the control environment appears to intensively intrude on those members ability to 
contribute. 
 
As noted earlier, somewhere between its conception and objectives, the implementation of the 
C.I.P. has become tainted. Organisation members feel that the process itself lacks the credibility 
that it seeks to attain. 
 
The forecast commitment from the bottom up has been continuously adjusted without the 
agreement of the members. 
 
I would argue that the interference, which is now frequently used in the C.I.P. process, takes 
away from the individual, member’s willingness to contribute. This can lead to a situation where 
“What you measure is what you get” referring to the situation where the intensive imposition of 
a concentration on measurement will illicit behaviour which satisfies that measurement. If the 
C.I.P. system continues to influence unduly the willingness to contribute, then it may not be 
surprising if the organisation members start playing the game and only forecast and contribute 
what they know will be acceptably achievable rather than what might be achievable.  
 
The notion of credibility is linked to that of trust and trusting. While there is recognition of the 
pragmatic need for budget credibility, there is a definite feeling amongst the organisation 
members that the C.I.P. is being manipulated in the search for that same credibility. In 
circumstances of uncertainty and choice, the notion of trust and risk has particular application. I 
would suggest that trust in the case business units is being tested by the disembedding actions of 
the budget system used as a steering mechanism. Historically trust was part of the organisation 
culture providing a protective shield that helped the organisation members in their everyday 
work action. It helped provide an atmosphere of trust and security, which helped the members 
take that leap of faith, which some specific business actions require. In this sense budgeting 
based on future possibilities may be too much of a risk in the current distrustful atmosphere of 
the C.I.P. system. 
 
The empirical data shows that the environmental pressure for results and its effect on corporate 
credibility has resulted in pressure being exerted on the corporation and has changed the order of 
things resulting in a reversal of the dependency links. Rather than there being the natural or 
previously accepted mediation over time, the current environment seems to be changing to the 
extent that the regulatory and mutually mediated space has been replaced by the imposition of 
the controlled use of steering mechanisms such as the budgetary control system. In this sense the 
steering media has been seen to constitute or force a mode of behaviour on individual members 
that appears to be historically unnatural. This has resulted in a negative effect on both the 
organisation members as well as the corporation. For the individual there is a developing sense 
of short-term outlook that is starting to show itself in a restrained contribution to the 
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organisation. The imposition through the steering mechanisms of the more penal contribution 
environment appears to be militating against that same contribution. The short-term outlook is 
encouraging a short –term contribution that in turn may have a long-term effect on the stability 
of the organisation. 
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